La former councilor provides an image of the Cecopi on the day of the dana to argue that there were no television screens or informative screens
The former councilor of Justice and Interior Salomé Pradas declared before the judge of Catarroja (Valencia) who is instructing the case of the dana that her «institutional» position did not have advisors in Emergency matters and that it was the experts who had to coordinate. Her decision «would have been very irresponsible if she had not listened to the technicians and applied what the plan said,» noted the former leader, who insisted that she could have committed «recklessness» or even legally could have been attributed a crime of prevarication.
This is stated in the declaration as investigated that the former councilor made on Friday, April 11 before the instructing judge and to which Europa Press has had access. As it already transpired that day, Pradas stated that she did not lead anything and that she had no experience in emergencies. She also focused on the lack of information in which, she said, the Hydrographic Confederation of the Júcar (CHJ) incurred and denied that they were waiting for the ‘president’, Carlos Mazón, to send the alert message to the population.
In her statement, in which she only answered questions from her lawyer, Pradas stated that the emergency plans, as explained by the technicians, are designed for automatic application so as not to have to think or make decisions and that she did not have technical knowledge — she has a degree in law and has practiced law–.
She also did not have advisors in emergency matters, as the office of the Ministry of Justice and Interior included a chief of staff, a press chief, an advisor on parliamentary affairs, and an advisor on general affairs. The experts in emergencies on the day of the dana, she pointed out, were the advisory committee of the Cecopi. There, as she pointed out, the Government delegate (Pilar Bernabé) and she were «not experts in the matter, but institutional representatives,» and the experts «were the ones who had to coordinate.»
She emphasized that, according to the flood plan, when level 2 is decreed, a management committee is established that, according to various rules
— she stated — exercises a «unique, coordinated, and collegiate management in which the presence of the representatives guarantees greater efficiency in the response of all administrations involved in the emergency.» «More than a single command, there is a single direction,» she summarized.
The former councilor defended that she was «at the forefront from the first minute, with her emergency team, busy and concerned.» At another moment, she emphasized that to deal with an emergency of that magnitude did not depend on the simple decision of one person, because that is not what the plan establishes, but rather it is necessary to listen to the members of the Cecopi and coordinate, attend to the recommendations of the advisory and operational emergency committee. For Pradas, the catastrophe had «many concurrent circumstances, there was a lack of information, and they were acting based on the information they had and proposing accordingly.» The technicians «assessed and proposed.»
Pradas provided a photograph of the physical location where she was. She explained to the judge that in the Cecopi there was a screen where they were connected via Webex and there were no television screens or information screens. There were «three walls, a door, and a panel with a door; and there was a hallway behind a wall where they had a cooler and a coffee maker.» In a room at the CCE — not at the 112 — there were officials with their screens, with a screen showing the time and they passed on the notices, although not specific or with details. That Cecopi room «only has walls and two doors.» Specifically, a paneled wall with a «more rudimentary» door that she used, she at most opened the door to attend to or make calls and then returned.
Regarding the timeline, she recounted that at eight o’clock she instructed her chief of staff to monitor the emergency to stay informed and asked the regional secretary and the general director of emergencies to monitor. She also spoke with the mayor of Valencia, asking about the evolution of the dana. She pointed out that the Government delegate did not call her to a meeting at 9:30 a.m. with other administrations and security forces, and she believes it would have been «convenient for better coordination.»
Regarding the Magro, the CCE issued a hydrological alert at 12:20 p.m., in accordance with the information transmitted «10 minutes before» by the CHJ. The regional administration did not withdraw the alert despite the fact that the CHJ, she stressed, reported three times that the flow was decreasing, and then did not warn that it was rising again.
THE UME
She talked about two calls with Bernabé at 12:23 and at 12:48, and, according to Pradas, at that time she did not propose activating the UME nor did the delegate because the firefighters of the provincial consortium and forest rangers were already deployed in the area and there was not yet a level 2 emergency declared. The former councilor added that at two o’clock in the afternoon she spoke again with the delegate because there was news of the Magro overflowing in Utiel and there she «immediately» requested the UME, although «it took 3 hours to be activated.»
She referred to the alerts from the CHJ from «13.40 to 15 and something and at 16.13 hours, to the Generalitat by email» and to the usefulness of the SAIH and added that «three times the flow and the alarm decreased, and until 18:43 there was no information about the flow from the CHJ» and it was not verbalized in the Cecopi. At 18:43, in the CHJ notice, it indicated 1st, 2nd, and 3rd flow warning, but, according to her words, «it never reached them, which shows that there were alerts that never reached them.» At 5:00 p.m. the Cecopi started, where she was present «from the call until the day she was dismissed.»
«AWARE» OF WHAT HAPPENED AT 9:00 PM
At several moments, Pradas insisted that «no one» told her about the danger of the Barranco del Poyo» and that she was doing «what the technicians proposed.» It was «very late,» she considered, when they notified the Generalitat Valenciana by email, not the Cecopi, that the landslide had already occurred and that they became aware of what happened around 9:00 PM.
Regarding the ES-Alert, she argued that on the day of the dana it was not a mechanism for alerting the population and was in an «experimental testing phase.» She stated that they did not wait for Carlos Mazón to make a decision or take action and that the message was delayed because it was a provisional system and there were «many concurrent circumstances that needed to be evaluated and they did not have all the information.»
Regarding calls to 112, she said that she was aware that it became «overwhelmed» and that some calls could not be answered even though the service was reinforced, she does not know if it was due to technical problems or some other cause because she did not have direct knowledge. And she pointed out that those calls did not reach the Cecopi because they were in different rooms, in different buildings, and she did not receive any calls from Paiporta, Chiva, etc., and they were focused on Utiel-Requena and Forata.
Finally, she insisted that she was «doing everything possible from her institutional position» from the very beginning and she believed that a national emergency should have been declared on that same day.
